SS BROTHERHOOD OF THE BELL

In 1945, a mysterious Nazi secret weapons project code-named "The Bell" left its underground bunker in lower Silesia, along with all its project documentation, and a four-star SS general named Hans Kammler. Taken aboard a massive six-engine Junkers 390 ultra-long range aircraft, "The Bell," Kammler, and all project records disappeared completely, along with the gigantic aircraft. It is thought to have flown to America or Argentina.

As a prelude to this disappearing act, the SS murdered most of the scientists and technicians involved with the project, a secret weapon that according to one German Nobel prize-winning physicist, was given a classification of "decisive for the war," a security classification higher than any other secret weapons project in the Third Reich, including its atomic bomb. What was "The Bell"? What new physics might the Nazis have discovered with it? How far did the Nazis go after the war to protect the advanced energy technology that it represented? In THE SS BROTHERHOOD OF THE BELL alternative science and history researcher Joseph P. Farrell reveals a range of exotic technologies the Nazis had researched, and challenges the conventional views of the end of World War Two, the Roswell incident, and the beginning of MAJIC-12, the government's alleged secret team of UFO investigators.

Excerpt:

On January 4th 1945, U.S. General George S. Patton wrote a remarkable thing in his war diary: "We can still lose this war." It was a remarkable statement, especially since the last large German offensive of World War Two, the Battle of the Bulge, was all but finished, and the victorious Allied armies, like their Soviet counterparts in the East, were then poised to deal the final death blows to Hitler's crumbling Third Reich. Optimism prevailed at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). For some reason, however, General "Blood and Guts" Patton, despite his well known public image of bravado and optimism, had serious private fears and reservations. The question is:

Why?

Why indeed, since on any conventional military appraisal, the German Reich was finished. It was only a matter of--- time.

But even with the ill-fated German Ardenines offensive - the Battle of the Bulge - there is more than meets the eye when one adds in the thesis of my previous book, Reich of the Black Sun, that the Nazis may have won the race for the atom bomb well ahead of the Manhattan Project. The objective of the German offensive was, according to the standard explanation, to break through thinly held American lines in the Ardennes, drive behind the Allied lines in Holland, seize the port of Antwerp, and thus not only drive a wedge between American and British forces, but also to cut the supply lines to British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery's armies in the Netherlands. But the standard explanation fails simply for the reason that the Allies would have been capable of using Dutch ports to supply the "trapped" armies. Thus, the end of the war presents, behind the "obvious" and "well known 'facts,"' yet another mystery. What really was the Nazi leadership trying to do, and why would it have caused such concern to General Patton to cause him to remark about it in his diary? British author Geoffrey Brooks pinpoints the hidden military and political reasoning that lay behind the Nazi offensive by raising precisely this question:

Hitler's Luftwaffe ADC von Below remarked in his 1982 memoirs that even he could not understand why Hitler wanted to go to Antwerp - "a place that led nowhere."

But the answer may lie in a curious order placed in German shipyards in the period leading up to the surprise German offensive, for an order for twenty-four "500-ton submersible barges able to transport and launch V-2 rockets" was placed at yards in Stettin and Elbing. And London was just within range of the V-2 from Antwerp.But the mystery does not yet end, for an offensive merely to resume the V-2 bombardment of England does not yet make sense.

According to Brooks, one only begins to see the logic behind the German offensive by seeing it connected to a resumption of V-2 attacks, for "the V-2 campaign had been a failure. Hitler knew that. There had to be something extra to make all this worthwhile." What that "something extra" was, was hinted at by none other than the Deputy Commanding General for the US Army Air Force's Intelligence, Lieutenant General Donal Putt, shortly after the war in 1946. Brooks' comments are worth citing extensively:

(Lt. General Putt) told the Society of Aeronautical Engineers: "The Germans were preparing rocket surprises for the whole world in general and England in particular which would have, it is believed, changed the course of the war if the invasion had been postponed for so short a time as half a year." Putt was also quoted in an aside as having stated that "the Germans had V-2s with atomic explosive warheads." A surprise is a surprise and hitherto ordinary rocket warfare had proved unproductive. The range of the V-2 was 200 miles. The crucial success of the Allied progress by December 1944 had therefore been to drive the German forces in Europe beyond this limit. The objective of the Ardennes campaign was the Belgian port of Antwerp, 200 miles from London.

In other words, once again, the Nazi atom bomb is the hidden logic at work in the operational plans of both sides late in the war, and is very likely the hidden operational logic behind the otherwise militarily indefensible German offensive in the Ardennes. Small wonder then, that Patton would remark "We can still lose this war," even at such a late date. Similarly, if this scenario is the basis of his remarks, then it also serves to indicate that America's most celebrated field commander was also privy to some very sensitive information.

As was seen in my previous book, Reich of the Black Sun, a number of articles appeared in the post-war Western press to corroborate the notion that the war was won, not against a tottering Reich, but just in the nick of time. The articles usually accompanied these evaluations with revelations of Nazi secret weapons, most of them on the "fantastic" end of the spectrum. Perhaps this was a ploy to convince the Western public that the Nazi leaders were quite insane - as if any convincing needed to be done by that point - and that their hopes were so wildly bizarre and unrealistic that indeed the Third Reich's military state in late 1944 and early 1945 was all but hopeless.